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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
It is clear that the policy allowing liberal amendment of
pleadings is inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the function
of a bill of particulars. When the two come into conflict, a court
will have to choose that which affords the better tool for imple-
mentation of the substantive rights involved.
If the edict of CPLR 104 is to be given effect, i.e., that the
CPLR is "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding," the instant
case is palatable indeed. If it be said that the case diminishes the
utility of the bill of particulars, let it be noted that it was the plan
of the CPLR's draftsmen to do away with that device altogether.1 3'
The court at bar felt that permitting the bill of particulars so to
limit the proof that nothing in the occurrence other than the passing
of a stop sign could be litigated was too technical a reading. If the
proof could be in any way expanded without substantial prejudice
to the other party, as the court might in the context of the case
determine, it would appear that the expansion, though a technical
deviation from the underlying theory of the bill of particulars, was
nonetheless a specific execution of the CPLR's yet broader under-
lying theory as enunciated in CPLR 104.
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
Discovery of names and addresses of witnesses and statements of
witnesses in the possession of an adverse party.
In Rios v. Donovan,132 a personal injury action, two problems
concerning the scope of disclosure were before the court. One
concerned the question of whether the names and addresses of
witnesses to an accident known by the adverse party may be the
subject of pre-trial discovery. The other involved the question of
the discovery of statements made by witnesses which are in the
possession of an adverse party. Each problem shall be dealt with
separately herein.
Problem I:-Disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses.
Plaintiff sought to discover, pursuant to CPLR 3120, the
names and addresses of all persons who witnessed the accident
and all persons having knowledge of facts concerning the accident
who had given statements to defendant or his attorney. The de-
fendant moved for a protective order under CPLR 3013. The
court held that proper procedure required plaintiff to ascertain the
names of witnesses through his examination of the defendant or
other persons during the taking of oral depositions concerning the
131 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3015, supp. commentary 57 (1964).
13221 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964).
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accident, rather than by seeking a list of their names under the
discovery provisions of 3120.
Although cases under the CPA have said that a party does
not have the right to obtain names of witnesses through dis-
closure,133 there was no absolute rule against it."' In fact, whether
the identities of witnesses were obtainable through pre-trial dis-
closure depended on two considerations: first, names of witnesses
had to be material and necessary for prosecution of the action;
and, second, their disclosure could not be sought solely for the
purpose of prying into an adversary's case. 3 5 Thus, the rule al-
lowed disclosure of the names of witnesses known to an adversary
if the witnesses participated in, or were responsible for the accident
complained of.'3 6 This rule also allowed discovery of the names
of witnesses who alone could describe the accident and without
whose testimony the party's case would fail.13 7  A more recent
trend under the CPA was to compel the divulgence of the identity
of a witness when in the course of an examination before trial
his identity became relevant in connection with the questions asked
the deponent during the deposition. 38
Under federal practice a party may, as a matter of right,
require disclosure of the names of all persons having knowledge
of the facts pertaining to the occurrence out of which the action
arose.' 9 The federal rules are based on the principle that persons
having knowledge of relevant facts are not necessarily the witnesses
of any particular party.'40 Moreover, a party in a federal action
may compel disclosure of all witnesses known by his adversary
by simply requesting a list of such witnesses through the use of
an interrogatory.' 4 '
1 Kosiur v. Standard-No. Buffalo Foundries, Inc., 255 App. Div. 930,
8 N.Y.S.2d 688 (4th Dep't 1938); Gavin v. N.Y. Contracting Co., 122 App.
Div. 643, 107 N.Y. Supp. 272 (1st Dep't 1907).
134 Weinstein & Bergman, New York Procedures to Obtain Information
in Civil Litigation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1066, 1086 (1957).
'5 Weinstein & Bergman, supra note 134; but see Giamberdino v. Mileo,
10 App. Div. 2d 814, 197 N.Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't 1960).613Milberg v. Lehrich, 2 App. Div. 2d 861, 156 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2d Dep't
1956); Arbuclde v. Loew's Theatre & Realty Corp., 200 Misc. 642, 108
N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1951), inodified, 280 App. Div. 945, 116 N.Y.S.2d
135 (2d Dep't 1952).
s7 McMahon v. Hayes-73rd Corp., 197 Misc. 318, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
138 Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Ist Dep't
1964); 3 WEiNSTri, KORN & Mn.LE, Nmv YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3101.11
(1964).
"39FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1959); Klop v. United Fruit Co.,
18 F.R.D. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"10 2A BARRON & HorTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACtiCE & PROCEDURE § 650, at 91
(1961).
24,FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 26(b).
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CPLR 3101 contains the general guidelines for disclosure
and, therefore, governs disclosure of names of witnesses. This
section is essentially a continuation of the scope of disclosure
contained in CPA §288.142 Under 3101(a) discovery of the
identities of witnesses should be allowed only if they are "material
and necessary." 143  Discovery should be denied under 3101(d)
where names are sought solely to pry into an opponent's case.""
The court has set forth a sound rule in requiring the plaintiff
to seek divulgence of unspecified witnesses through oral depositions
as to the event itself. By requiring the use of the deposition
device, the names of those witnesses who are material and essential
to plaintiff's case will be brought out by the questions asked
during the depositions. Their identities should be divulged by
the deponent. An opposing attorney should no longer answer
"declined" when the name of a witness is requested. If the
deponent refuses to disclose the identity of a witness the plaintiff
may ask the court to compel disclosure.'4 5 The court is now
in a position to look at the testimony taken at the deposition and
make a determination as to whether the identity of the witness
sought is material. If the identity of the witness is material, the
court can order disclosure; if not, the court can deny it. This
procedure protects persons who are not material to a party's
case from vexatious depositions. Furthermore, the rule encourages
an attorney to conduct his own investigation; he cannot merely
wait for his opponent to complete his investigation and then
simply ask for a list of witnesses acquired by his opponent.
It should be noted that the allowance of a liberal disclosure
of witnesses' names permits the parties to make a thorough assess-
ment of the case and the possibilities of success on trial. To
the extent that disclosure of names of witnesses results in the
settlement of cases before trial which otherwise would have gone
to trial, disclosure will result in a great saving of precious time
and expense. Hence, a major purpose of the CPLR will have
been realized.
142 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 6.
143 It should be noted that the identity of an expert witness as distinguished
from a factual witness should be disclosed. See Miller v. United States,
192 F. Supp. 218 (D.C. Del. 1961). The weight and value of an expert's
testimony depends largely upon the qualifications of the expert; therefore,
his qualifications may be the subject of intensive investigation by the oppos-
ing counsel, which investigation can only be conducted after a timely as-
certainment of the name of the proposed expert witness.
S44This would be considered "material prepared for litigation." Identity
of witnesses should not be excluded under CPLR 3101(c) as in such case
this would constitute an absolute preclusion to their disclosure. There was
no absolute rule against disclosure of witnesses' names under the CPA and
none was contemplated under the CPLR.
145 CPLR 3124. Penalties may be invoked under CPLR 3126.
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Problem II:-Disclosure of statements by witnesses in the
possession of an adverse party.
In his notice to discover pursuant to CPLR 3120, plaintiff
in the instant case requested inspection of all statements obtained
prior to the commencement of the action by defendants or their
agents from persons possessing knowledge of the accident. The
court did not presently decide what it termed the "perennially
thorny problem" of obtaining statements by witnesses, but it held
that the notice to discover under CPLR 3121 requires specification
"with reasonable particularity" of the documents sought to be
discovered. Since plaintiff's "blunderbuss" notice to discover
all statements by witnesses did not specify which statements he
sought, he should first ascertain through depositions or otherwise
what statements were made and then specify those he wishes to
inspect. It is only when a party has specified the documents
he seeks that the court can intelligently decide whether the
statements are immune from disclosure because they are privileged
matter, attorney's work product, or material prepared for litigation.' 46
Conclusion
The court's resolution of each problem, discovery of a list
of unspecified witnesses and discovery of all statements of witnesses,
was based on the same theory. As the court said: "While the
policy of the CPLR is to broaden disclosure procedures, discovery
should not be permitted to substitute for independent investigation
of facts which are equally available to both parties." 147 However,
the court continued: "we do not suggest that under the CPLR
discovery and inspection can be obtained only after the taking of
oral or written depositions." 148 The court indicated that under
the circumstances of the instant case, the taking of depositions
was necessary in order to ascertain which witnesses were material
to plaintiff's case and to identify documents in the possession and
control of an adverse party.
Prior inspection of records during examination before trial does
not preclude reinspection by discovery under CPLR 3120.
In Lindenman v. Thompson,149 a personal injury action,
defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3120 for discovery and
inspection of the plaintiff's income tax returns. Plaintiff in
opposition to defendant's motion contended that because these
2" CPLR 3101.
147 Rios v. Donovan, supra note 138, at 413, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
148 Id. at 414, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
14943 Misc. 2d 30, 249 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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